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NOTES

CROSSING THE LINE: THE SECOND, SIXTH,
NINTH, AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS'
MISAPPLICATION OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT'S
"ANY OTHER FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX"
DEFENSE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1963, Congress passed the Equal Pay Act' making it illegal for
employers to pay one sex a higher salary than that paid to members of
the other sex for equal work.2 To establish a prima facie case under the
Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an employer pays one
sex a higher salary than the other sex for performing work that is equal
in "skill, effort, and responsibility, and which [is] performed under
similar working conditions." 3 Congress deliberately chose to incorporate

1. Pub. L. No. 88-38,77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988)). The
Equal Pay Act of 1963, prohibiting sex-based wage discrimination, was passed as an amendment to
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
2. The Equal Pay Act provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where
such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based
on any other factor other than sex ....
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
3. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). The court held that once an
employee satisfies the burden of showing that the employer pays workers of one sex more than
workers of the opposite sex for equal work, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the pay
differential is based on one of the Act's four affirmative defenses. Id. at 196-97.
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"equal" instead of "comparable" when it enacted the Equal Pay Act.4
Thus, the positions to be compared must be "substantially equal" in order

for a plaintiff to bring a claim under the Act.5 It is very difficult to
satisfy the "substantially equal" requirement for determining whether the

jobs are equal in terms of skill, effort, responsibility and working
conditions.6
After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to

the employer to show that the pay differential is justified according to
one of the Act's four affirmative defenses.7 Employers satisfy their

burden if the pay differential is based on: "(i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor
other than sex." 8 There has been a great deal of inconsistency among
the various circuits when applying the Act's "factor other than sex"
defense.9 Some courts have properly interpreted this defense according
to its plain meaning and apply it according to its intended broad
scope.10 Fallon i.Illinois illustrates the broad application of the "factor
other than sex" defense."
In Failon, the plaintiff brought an Equal
Pay Act claim against the State of Illinois because a state law permitted

4. Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235,238 (5th Cir. 1973). City Stores held that the
employer violated the Equal Pay Act because the jobs compared were "substantially equal" even
though "substantially equal" is a difficult standard to satisfy. Id. at 237-38.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. CorningGlass Works, 417 U.S. at 196-97.
8. Id. at 196 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(l)).
9. Compare Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that an
employer's gender-neutral "factor other than sex" is sufficient to justify pay differential between
male and female employees) and Covington v. Southern Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir.
1987), cerL denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (holding that the pay differential at the Illinois University
"was the result of a factor other than sex") and Streaker v. Grand Forks County Social Serv. Bd.,
640 F.2d 96, 100 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding that the pay differential at the county social services board
was based on a "dual classification system") with Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d
520, 527 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 440 (1992) (holding that an employer must demonstrate a business-related "factor other than sex" in order to justify a pay differential between male
and female employees) and EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249,253 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding
"that the legitimate business reason standard is the appropriate bencholmark against which to measure
the 'factor other than sex' defense") and Glenn v. General Motors, 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988) (concluding that the "factor other than sex" exception did
not apply because the pay differential did not result from "unique characteristics of the same job;
from an individual's experience, training, or ability; or from special exigent circumstances connected
with the business") and Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982) (arguing that
it would be impractical to apply a factor "that rests on some consideration unrelated to business").
10. See Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211; Covington, 816 F.2d at 322; Strecker, 640 F.2d at 100.
11. 882 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1989).
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only wartime veterans to be eligible for Veteran Service Officer positions. 2 This law confined most women to a lower paying job that
required the same work."3 The Seventh Circuit upheld the law, stating
that wartime veteran status could constitute
a "factor other than sex" if
14
based on a gender-neutral criterion.
However, other circuits have rejected the broad application of the
Act's fourth affirmative defense and require that the employer's "factor
other than sex" stem from a legitimate business need.15 For example,
in Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District,'6 a school district paid
female cleaners lower wages than male custodians.' 7 The school district
claimed that this wage differential was justified because its civil service
classification, which was facially gender-neutral, was a valid "factor other
than sex."18 To qualify for the custodial position, an applicant had to
take a civil service exam. 19 A cleaner, who claimed she was performing the same work as custodians, took the exam, but the district refused
to reclassify her because she was not among the top three scorers.20
The court held that for a civil service exam to qualify as a valid "factor
other than sex," the employer had to prove that the exam was related to
the custodian's job performance.?2 '
The inconsistency among the circuits exists because the United
States Supreme Court has not directly answered the question of whether
the "any other factor other than sex' defense must stem from a legitimate
business need. Some of this inconsistency is due to the unclear dicta
written by Justice Brennan in County of Washington v. Gunther.'
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority; found that employers can defend against discrimination claims and justify pay differentials under the

12. Id. at 1207.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1212.
15. See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; JC.Penney Co., 843 F.2d at 253; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571;
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
16. 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 440 (1992).
17. Id. 522-23.
18. Id. at 522, 524.
19. Id. at 522.
20. Id.at 522-23.
21. Id. at 527.
22. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). Claiming that they were paid lower wages than the male guards in
the male section of the prison and that this pay differential was due to intentional sex discrimination,
four female guards filed suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act seeking back pay and
other relief. Id. at 163-64. The plaintiffs brought their action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 because "the Equal Pay Act did not apply to municipal employees" at the time of the
suit. Id. at 164 n.3.
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Equal Pay Act by showing that the difference in pay is "based on a bona
fide use of 'other factors other than sex."'
The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have improperly
interpreted this "bona fide use" as requiring that the "factor other than
sex" must'be related to a business requirement.2 4 Even though the
language of the Equal Pay Act clearly permits an employer to justify a
wage differential based on "any other factor other than sex," these
circuits have improperly disregarded the Act's plain meaning 5 and instead interpret the statute as requiring a business-related "factor other
than sex. 2 6 To justify their implementation of a business-related
"factor other than sex," these circuits place much emphasis on the Act's
legislative history.2 7 The problem with overemphasizing the Act's
legislative history is twofold. First, although some legislative history
exists to support their view of a business-related "factor other than sex,"
these circuits fail to acknowledge the equal amount of legislative history
supporting the position that the "any other factor other than sex"
affirmative defense is satisfied once an employer demonstrates that the
pay differential is based on a gender-neutral factor.28 Second, these circuits fail to take into account the numerous problems associated with
relying on legislative history to determine Congress' intent.29
On the other hand, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have properly
decided that the employer can justify a pay differential by setting forth
any gender-neutral "factor other than sex."3'
Since the language of the
Act's fourth affirmative defense is clear,3 the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits have properly construed the "any other factor other than sex"
23. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170.
24. See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; J.C Penney Co., 843 F.2d at 253; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571;
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.

25. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (holding that statutory interpretation should begin by analyzing the plain meaning of the words in the statute). The Second,
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have violated the plain meaning rule because they have not
interpreted the "any other factor other than sex" according to its plain meaning, but chose to interpret
the "any other factor other than sex" as requiring that the factor stem from a legitimate business requirement. See also Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d at 253; Glenn, 841 F.2d

at 1571; Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
26. See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d at 253; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571;
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
27. See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 42-47.
29. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.

30. See Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211; Covington, 816 F.2d at 322; Strecker, 640 F.2d at 100.
31. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917) (holding that when the language
of a statute is clear, the starting place for all statutory interpretation is the plain meaning of the
statute's language).
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defense according to its plain meaning and thus have not. placed too
much weight on the Act's legislative history?2 If Congress truly
intended for an employer to justify a pay differential by setting forth a
business-related "factor other than sex," Congress could have done either
of two things. First, Congress could have simply drafted the Act's fourth
affirmative defense to read "any business-related factor other than sex."
Second, Congress could have amended the Equal Pay Act to incorporate
a business-related requirement as Congress has done in the past when a
statute contains language that does not best exemplify its legislative
intent 3 Since Congress has not acted in accordance with either
scenario, the Seventh and Eight Circuits' interpretation of the "any other
factor other than sex" defense (i.e. requiring an employer to justify a pay
differential by
setting forth any gender-neutral "factor other than sex")
34
must prevail.
This Note will show that the Act's "any other factor other than sex"
defense must be applied broadly and that the employer must not be
required to prove that the "factor other than sex" stems from a legitimate
business need. Part II of this Note will analyze the Act's legislative
history to determine Congress' intent in adopting the "factor other than
sex" defense and will conclude that the legislative history is not useful
in analyzing the Act's fourth affirmative defense. Part II will analyze
the Act according to its plain meaning and will determine that a business
relation requirement for the "factor other than sex" is clearly not within
the plain meaning interpretation of the statute. Part IV will critique
judicial interpretations that require that the "any other factor other than
sex" defense be business-related. Part V critiques the Fifth Circuit's
implementation of disparate-treatment analysis in Equal Pay Act claims.
Part VI will analyze judicial interpretations that properly require that the
employer justify a wage differential by setting forth a gender-neutral
"factor other than sex." In Part VII, the author will conclude that the
"factor other than sex" defense must be applied when an employer
properly sets forth a gender-neutral criterion as a justification for the pay
differential and will discuss the various policy reasons for doing so.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF "FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX"

In 1963, the Equal Pay Act amended the Fair Labor Standards

32. See Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211; Covington, 816 F.2d at 322; Strecker, 640 F.2d at 100.

33. See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
34. See Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211; Covington, 816 F.2d at 322; Strecker, 640 F.2d at 100.
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Act of 1938"s by incorporating a new subsection (d) to section 6.36
The Equal Pay Act forbids an employer from paying an employee of one
sex more than an employee of the other sex for doing work that is
substantially equal, unless the employer can justify the pay differential
based on "(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
'
differential based on any other factor other than sex."37
Once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer
to satisfy one of the Act's four affirmative defenses.3" Although the
first three affirmative defenses are clear in terms of their application, the
fourth generated much debate and discussion during its drafting in
Congress.39 The only indisputable point regarding the legislative history
for the "factor other than sex" defense is that the drafters had two
objectives in mind: the preservation of employer discretion and that
employers set wages based only on "factors other than sex."4
However, it is unclear from the Act's legislative history whether the
drafters intended the "factor other than sex" to be business-related or
41
gender-neutral because an argument can be made for either view.
The view that the "factor other than sex" should be construed to
encompass any gender-neutral factor is explained by Representative
Goodell, the bill's primary sponsor, who stressed the importance of
preserving employer discretion in an exchange with Representative

35. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988)).
36. Id. § 206(d) (1988).
37. Coming Glass works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188,196 (1974) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)

(1988)).
38. Id. Whether the Act's four exceptions serve as affirmative defenses is not clearly slated
in the Act's legislative history. The bill's primary sponsor, Representative Goodell, expressed that

the four exceptions were not affirmative defenses but part of the plaintiff's burden. 109 CONG. REC.
9208 (1963). However, after examining the Act's legislative history and other judicial decisions,
the United States Supreme Court in Corning Glass Works found that once a plaintiff sets forth a
prima facie case, the burdens of proof and production shift to the employer to satisfy one of these
four affirmative defenses. Corning Glass Work, 417 U.S. at 196-97 (1974).
39. The legislative history indicates that members of Congress differ as to whether the "factor
other than sex"' defense should stem from a legitimate business need. See 109 CONG. REC. 9198
(1963); Nina J. Kimball, Note, Not Just Any "FactorOther Than Sex". An Analysis ofthe Fourth
Affirmative Defense of the EqualPayAct, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 318,320 n.l (1984) (citing S.
REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., IstSess. 4 (1963)).
40. See 109 CONG. REc. 9198 (1963).

41. The legislative history is not decisive in determining whether Congress intended for a
business-related "factor other than sex" since the legislative record contains ample testimony supporting a gender-neutral application of the "factor other than sex" defense. See 109 CoNG. REC.
9198 (1963); Kimball, supranote 39,at 318, 320 n.1l (1984) (citing S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong.,
IstSess. 4 (1963)).
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Griffin.4 2

[MR. GOODELL.]

[W]e want the private enterprise system, employer and employees and a union.., to have a maximum degree of
discretion in working out the evaluation
of the employee's work and how much
he should be paid for it.

[MR. GRIFFIN.]

So long as pay differentials are not
based on sex.

[MR. GOODELL.]

Yes, as long as it is not based on sex.
That is the sole factor that we are inserting here as a restriction. 43

Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan' examined the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act and
concluded that Congress must have intended that the "factor other than
sex" defense serve as a broad general exception because to hold
otherwise would disrupt the bona fide job evaluation systems used by
American businesses.45 This concern is apparent in the statements of
many legislators! 6 For instance, Representative Griffin explained that
the fourth affirmative defense is a broad principle "which makes clear
and explicitly states that a differential based on any factor or factors
other than sex would not violate this legislation."47
Although certain excerpts from the House debates indicate that
Congress intended the fourth affirmative defense to encompass any factor
other than sex, 48 some courtsP and scholars 0 believe that a narrower

42. 109 CoNG. REc. 9198 (1963).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
45. Id. at 199-201.
46. 109 CONG. REc. 9198 (1963).
47. 109 CONG. REc. 9203 (1963) (emphasis added); see also id. at 9196 (statement of Representative Frelinghuysen); id. at 9198 (statement of Representative Goodell); id. at 9202 (statement
ofRepresentative Kelly); id. at 9209 (statement of Representative Goodell); id. at 9217 (statements
of Representative Pucinski and Representative Thompson).
48. See 109 CONG. REc. 9198 (1963). Representative Goodell, the bill's primary sponsor,
expressly stated that sex is the "sole factor" that employers are prohibited from using as the basis
for the pay differential. Id.
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interpretation of the exception best exemplifies the language and
committee reports of the Act. Their view is that Congress did not intend

the "factor other than sex" to mean just any gender-neutral factor, but
rather that Congress drafted this seemingly broad general exclusion
because, as a matter of space constraints, the Act could not list every sinThe proponents of a business-related requirement
gle exception."
justify their view of Congress' intent by placing much weight on

statements such as Representative Griffin's explanation that classifications such as a seniority system, a merit system, and a piecework

system are examples of factors that would justify a wage differential
under the fourth affirmative defense. 52

Moreover, they point to a

Senate Committee Report which also characterizes a "factor other than
sex" in terms of such valid classification systems as seniority, merit, and
piece-work.53

Additionally, the language of this Senate Committee

Report suggests not only that such systems are examples of "factor[s]
other than sex," but that the breadth of this exception is limited and that
the defense does not encompass just any factors.5 '

Furthermore, the

proponents of a business-related requirement refer to a House Report

49. Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520,525 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 440 (1992); EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249,253 (6th Cir. 1988); Glenn v. General
Motors, 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988), cert denied,488 U.S. 948 (1988); Kouba v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
50. Ellen M. Bowden, Note, Closing the Pay Gap: Redefining the Equal Pay Act's Fourth
Affirmative Defense, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 225,227-28 (1993) (explaining that the "factor
other than sex' affirmative defense should be business-related because otherwise an employer could
make up any gender-neutral factor and use it as a pretext for discrimination); Kimball, supra note
39, at 322.
51. H.R. REP. No.309,88th Cong., 1st Sess.pt. 7, at 3 (1963), reprintedin 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N.
687, 689.
52. 109 CONG. REc. 9203 (1963). During the House debate on the bill, Representative Griffin
stated "Roman numeral iv [the 'factor other than sex'] is a broad principle, and those preceding it
are really examples: such factors as a seniority system, a merit system, or a system which measures
earnings on the basis of quality or quantity of production." Id. Advocates of a business-related
"factor other than sex" place much emphasis on this piece of legislative history because it demonstrates that Congress intended that the "factor other than sex" be business-related since it is merely
an example of the preceding business-related affirmative defenses (a seniority system, a merit
system, and a system which measures earnings on the basis of quality or quantity of production).
to allocate the same amount
Kimball, supra note 39, at 324. However, these same advocates fail
of emphasis on the parts of the Act's legislative history that clearly indicate Congress' intent for a
gender-neutral application of the "factor other than sex" defense.
Sess. 4 (1963)).
53. Kimball, supra note 39, at 324 (citing S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., Ist
54. Kimball, supra note 39, at 324 (citing S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963)).
Certain members ofthe Senate expressed their disapproval of a broad application of the "factor other
than sex" defense because it would permit employers to justify wage differentials by setting forth
any motive or factor not based on sex. Kimball, supra note 39, at 320.
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which provides examples of acceptable factors that would satisfy the

Act's fourth affirmative defense. 55
After analyzing the Act's legislative history in light of both sides of

the argument for a business-related "factor other than sex," it is clear that
neither side can rely on the Act's legislative history to justify its position

because the legislative history is not conclusive in either direction.
Additionally, the criticism of courts using legislative history as a means
for statutory interpretation is two-pronged. First, it is argued that the use
of legislative history is inconsistent with the democratic theory embodied
in the Constitution 6 In other words, if the objective of legislative
history is to find the intent of the legislature, "[legislative materials ... at best can shed light only on the 'intent' of that small portion of
Congress in which such records originate; [the legislative materials]
therefore lack the holistic 'intent' found in the statute itself."5" Second,
the reliability of legislative history to show Congress' intent has been
questioned.5" The most extreme example of this criticism comes from
Justice Scalia. 9 This criticism addresses corruption, which is described

as "making" or "planting legislative history.' 60

"Planting" refers to

adding to the legislative record (e.g., committee reports and the Con-

gressional Record) language which is not intended to influence the legislative enactment process, but rather to influence the judicial interpretive
Sess. pt. 7, at 3 (1963), reprintedin 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N.
55. H.R. REP.No. 309, 88th Cong., Ist
687, 689 (listing the following factors that would satisfy the Act's fourth affirmative defense: shift
differentials, work hours, physical requirements of a job, experience, training, and ability).
56. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between Congressmen ...are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President.).
57. Kenneth NV. Starr, ObservationsAbout The Use Of Legislative History, 1987 DuKE LJ.
371,375.
58. Abner J.Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr'sObservations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 384.
concurring). Justice Scalia
59. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
explains:
That the Court should refer to the citation of three District Court cases in a document
issued by a single committee of a single house as the action of Congress displays the
level of unreality that our unrestrained use of legislative history has attained ....As
anyone familiar with modem-day draffing of congressional committee reports is well
aware, the references to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on
his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of
a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not primarily to inform the
Members of Congress what the bill meant ...but rather to influence judicial construction. What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her citation
of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the land, thereafter
dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.
60. Mikva, supra note 58, at 384.
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process.6 t Thus, the more the courts rely on legislative history, the
greater the incentive for such corruption of the legislative record. 62
IM.

THE PLAIN MEANrNG OF THE FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

In those instances in which the language of the statute is clear, the
clear language should govern the judicial decision. 63 Known as the
plain meaning rule, this rule is the starting place of all statutory interpretation.Y
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance,
be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is
plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to
enforce it according to its terms.65
Essentially, the judiciary must yield to the words of the legislature and
assure ours laws of their "democratic pedigree. ' 6 Furthermore, the
United States Supreme Court has held that "[w]here the language is plain
and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does
not arise and the rules [of using legislative history as a means of
statutory interpretation] which are to aid doubtful meanings need no
67
discussion."
The Equal Pay Act clearly states: "No employer... shall discriminate... between employees on the basis of sex [when equal.work is performed] ... except where such payment is made pursuant to... (iv) a

61. Mikva, supra note 58, at 384. Judge Mikva writes about his experience in Congress:

Two members will rise and engage in a colloquy for the purpose of 'making legislative
history.' Frequently, however, the colloquy is written by just one of the members, not
both. It is handed to the other actor and the two of them read it like a grade B radio
script. And that is the material that judges later will solemnly pore over, under the guise
of 'studying the legislative history.' This, of course, is ridiculous.

Mikva, supra note 58, at 384.
62. Mikva, supranote 58, at 384. The criticism of legislative history has had an effect. See
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses ofLegislativeHistory in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845,
846 (1992) (reporting that 10 out of the 65 statutory cases decided by the Supreme Court during its

1989 term made no reference to legislative history and that in 1990, 19 out of 55 decisions were
similarly free of reference to legislative history).

63. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See CAss R. SUNsTN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REvOLUION 113 (1990).
67. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485.
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differential based on any other factor other than sex ... .68 Since the
language of the Equal Pay Act is clear, the Act's plain meaning is the
starting place for statutory interpretation and there is no need to analyze

the Act's legislative history 9 However, certain scholars7° and
courts71 refuse to acknowledge the plain meaning of the word "any" and
insist that the "any other factor other than sex" must stem from a legitimate business need. These courts and scholars fail to acknowledge
that virtually every dictionary defines the word "any" as "regardless of

kind." 2 Thus, when interpreting the "factor other than sex" according
to its plain meaning, it is not plausible for an individual or a court to
make the argument that "any other factor other than sex" means not any
factor, but a factor that is business-related. The doctrine of interpreting
statutes based on their plain meaning is alive and well and was recently
invoked by the Supreme Court in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.

American Telephone & Telegraph Co.73
In MCI,the Federal Communications Commission ("Commission")
pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2), issued an order stating that its earlier
decision to make tariff filing optional for all non-dominant long distance

carriers was within its authority to "modify. '74 The only dominant long
distance carrier, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
appealed to the D.C. Circuit to reverse the Commission's order.75 The

Supreme Court held that the Commission's permissive detariffing policy
was not a valid exercise of its power under 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) to
"modify any requirement." 76 The Court reasoned that since the word

"modify" means to change moderately or in minor fashion, § 203(b)(2)
68. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
69. See Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485 (holding that courts should only use a statute's legislative
history when the language of the statute is unclear).
70. Bowden, supra note 50, at 227; Kimball, supra note 39, at 322.
71. See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520,525 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 440 (1992); EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988); Glenn
v. General Motors, 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Ilth Cir. 1988), cert. denied,488 U.S. 948 (1988); Kouba
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
72. See THE AMRICAN HERITAGE DICIONARY 117 (2d ed. 1985); see also WEBSTER'S
DIrCoNARY 21 (1986) (defining "any" as "one of many).
73. 114 S.Ct. 2223 (1994).
74. MC, 114 S.Ct. at 2227, 2228. See also 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)-(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. V
1994). Section 203(a) provides: "Every common carrier, except connecting carriers, shall, within
such reasonable time as the Commission shall designate, file [tariffs] with the Commission ...:'
Id. § 203(a). Section 203(b)(2) provides: "The Commission may, in its discretion and for good
cause shown, modify any requirement made by or under the authority of this section ...." Id.
§ 203(b)(2) (emphasis added).
75. MCI, 114 S. Ct. at 2228.
76. Id. at 2229.
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does not allow the Commission to make basic or fundamental changes
such as the order it issued in this case.77 In other words, the
Commission's permissive detariffing policy could not be justified as a
moderate or minor "modification."
Therefore, based upon the Court's
interpretation of the statute's plain meaning, the79Commission only had
the proper authority to authorize minor changes.
Furthermore, even if applying the plain meaning of a statute would
result in an unfair or ridiculous judicial decision, judges must still fulfill
their constitutional obligation to interpret the statute according to its plain
meaning if the language is clear.80 *In Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill,"' Congress appropriated millions of dollars in initial funds to
develop the Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project on the Tennessee
River.' The purpose of the Tellico Project was to spur shoreline development, generate enough electricity to heat 20,000 residences, and afford
flatwater recreation and flood control, in addition to stimulating
economic improvements in "an area characterized by under-lutilization
'
of human resources and outmigration of young people."83
However,
after years of construction and with the dam near completion, the
Secretary of the Interior tried to halt the project because snail darters, an
endangered species, were found in the dam area." Although the
Tennessee Valley Authority claimed that the Endangered Species Act did
not apply to this project because it was "authorized, funded, and
substantially constructed before the Act was passed,"" respondents filed
suit to enjoin completion of the dam. The Supreme Court, applying the
plain meaning of the Endangered Species Act, held that "[tlhe plain
intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. 816 Thus, even

77. Id. at 2229, 2230.
78. Id. at 2232.

79. Id. at 2229.
80. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
81. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).

82. Id. at 157, 166.
83. Id.

84. Id. at 162.
85. Id. at 163.
86. Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 184. See also Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C. § 1536 (1988). The statute provides:
The Secretary shall review other programs administered by him and utilize such programs
in furtherance of the purpose ofthis chapter ....[Tihe purposes of this chapter [consist
of] carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species ...[and of insuring] that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by [a federal]... agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
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though millions of dollars would be wasted and 20,000 homes would be
without electricity, the Supreme Court felt compelled to apply the plain
meaning of the Endangered Species Act and preserve the snail darter.37

However, Congress in 1979, expressly mandated the completion of the
project in an appropriations bill that exempted the Tellico Dam from

compliance with the Endangered Species Act. 8 Since Congress has
amended the Endangered Species Act to allow the Tennessee Valley

Authority to complete construction, the Supreme Court will no longer be
bound by the plain meaning of the original Endangered Species Act and
thus will not be constitutionally obligated to render an unfair judicial
decision3 9
Although it is argued that a plain meaning application of the "any

other factor other than sex" would result in unfair judicial decisions by
providing employers with loopholes to escape discrimination charges

under the Act,90 the plain meaning of this affirmative defense must still
prevail. If Congress had intended the Act's fourth affirmative defense
to be business-related, Congress would have either drafted or amended
it to read "any other factor other than sex that is business-related."
However, Congress did not do so." Therefore, based on the plain

meaning of the Act's "any other factor other than sex" defense, an
employer is not required to set forth a legitimate business reason to

justify a pay differential, but must produce sufficient evidence that a
gender-neutral criterion is the reason for the pay differential.92

species or threatened species orresult in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat
of such species which is determined by the Secretary ....
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
87. Tennessee ValleyAuth., 437 U.S. at 173-74.
88. Act of Sept. 25, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 449-50 provides:
For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of
1933, as amended... Provided, That notwithstanding the provisions of 16 U.S.C.,
chapter 35 or another law, the [Tennessee Valley Authority] is authorized and directed
to complete construction, operate and maintain the Tellico Dam and Reservoir project for
navigation, flood control, electric power generation and other purposes, including the
maintenance of a normal summer reservoir pool of 813 feet above sea level.
Id. (emphasis added).
89. See Tennessee ValleyAuth., 437 U.S. at 194.
90. See infra note 94.
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
92. See Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989); Covington v. Southern I11.
Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 321-22 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,484 U.S. 848 (1987).
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IV. THE BUSINESS RELATION REQUIREMENT
The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits interpret the fourth
affirmative defense as requiring that a "factor other than sex" stem from
a legitimate business need. 3 The reason these circuits incorporate a
business relation requirement into the defense is because they believe if
such a requirement were not there, employers could easily find loopholes
to justify discriminatory pay differentials.94 Furthermore, they argue
that Congress never intended to provide an employer with a loophole that
would undercut the purpose of the Act, which was to eliminate sex
95
discrimination at the work place.
Aldrich v. Randolph CentralSchool Districtis the most recent case
to hold that employers must justify a pay differential by basing it on a
"factor other than sex" that is business-related, not gender-neutral. 96
The Second Circuit held that an employer cannot justify a pay differential, between cleaners (all females) and custodians, based on a civil
service test and on a classification system if both are not business-related

"factor[s] other than sex."97

After analyzing the Act's legislative

history, the court concluded that Congress must have intended for a

business relation requirement to be incorporated in the fourth affirmative
defense because otherwise, the "factor-other-than-sex defense would

provide a gaping loophole in the statute through which many pretexts for

93. See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 440 (1992); EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir 1988); Glenn v.
General Motors, 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (1Ith Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988); Kouba
v. Allstate Ins. Co, 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
94. The Ninth Circuit expressed its belief that a business relationship requirement should be
read into the 'Tactor other than sex" defense because otherwise, "an employer could easily
manipulate factors having a close correlation to gender as a guise to pay female employees
discriminatorily low salaries." Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
95. See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d at 253; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1570
(quoting Brock v. Georgia Southwestern College, 765 F.2d 1026, 1037 (11th Cir. 1985)); Kouba,
691 F.2d at 876. The Aldrich court found:
Without ajob-relatedness requirement, the factor-other-than-sex defense would provide
a gaping loophole in the statute through which many pretexts for discrimination would
be sanctioned. Surely Congress did not intend that an employee would lose an [Equal
Pay Act] claim after making out a prima facie case of wage discrimination simply because [an employer based the pay differential on a gender-neutral factor] ....
Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525.
96. Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520,525 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.denied, 113
S. Ct. 440 (1992).
97. Id. at 522, 527.
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'98

The Sixth Circuit, in EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co.,99 justified the
employer's wage differential by upholding a "head of household" clause,
which provided spousal health insurance only to spouses who earned less
100
than the employee, as a business-related "factor other than sex."
"We now hold that the legitimate business reason standard is the

appropriate benchlmark against which to measure the 'factor other than
sex' defense."'O The Sixth Circuit reached its decision by relying on
the Kouba decision"0 2 and by not applying an "extreme interpretation'

of the "factor other than sex" defense. °3 The "extreme interpretation"
consists of"plac[ing] an impossibly high standard on the employer by requiring it to show that the factor used does not 'perpetuate historic sex
discrimination.""" However, the Sixth Circuit, along with the court
in Kouba, refused to interpret the "factor other than sex" as just a
gender-neutral factor because that would "facilitate an employer's
disguising all but the most blatant discrimination."' s Instead, the court
required that an employer demonstrate that the "factor [other than sex]
was adopted for a legitimate business
reason and used reasonably in light
06

of the employer's stated purpose.'

The Ninth Circuit, in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co.,

7

was the

first court to implement a business-related requirement in the "factor
other than sex" defense.'
In Kouba, female agents claimed that an
insurance company's use of prior salaries to set the wages of all new

98. Id. at 525. The Aldrich court found:
Based on [the Act's] statutory history, we conclude that employers cannot meet their
burden of proving that a factor-other-than-sex is responsible for a wage differential by
asserting use of a gender-neutral classification system without more. Rather, Congress
intended for ajob classification system to serve as a factor-other-than-sex defense to sexbased wage discrimination claims only when the employer proves that the job
classification system resulting in differential pay is rooted in legitimate business-related
differences in work responsibilities and qualifications for the particular positions at issue.
Aldrich, 963 F2d at 525.
99. 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988).
100. Id. at250-51.
101. Id. at 253.
102. Id. The Kouba court justified a business-related "factor other than sex" by deferring to the
parts of the Act's legislative history that supported this proposition. Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876. See
infra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
103. J.C. Penney, Co., 843 F.2d at 253.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
108. Id. at 876.
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sales agents resulted in females being paid less than males.'
The
court, in reversing summary judgment for the agents, held that while the
Act did not prohibit an employer's use of prior salary as a "fdctor other
than sex," the district court had to examine whether this use of prior
salary, which resulted in lower wages for females, was consistent with
a legitimate business reason.1
However, the court does admit that
interpreting the "factor other than sex" defense based on its plain
meaning creates a "broad general [gender neutral] exception" which does
not require the "factor" to be business-related."' In spite of acknowledging the clarity of the Act's plain meaning, the Kouba court
decided to defer to the Act's legislative history in order to justify implementing a business-related requirement into the "factor other than
sex.""
Further, the court held that "[ilt would be nonsensical to
sanction the use of a factor that rests on some consideration unrelated to
business. An employer thus cannot use a factor which causes a wage
differential between
male and female employees absent an acceptable
' 113
business reason."
4
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in Glenn v. General Motors,"
requires an employer to justify a pay differential by setting forth a
General Motors attempted
business-related "factor other than sex.""'
6
to justify its pay differential on the basis of a market force theory."
The theory contends that the forces of supply and demand in the market
compel employers to pay women lower wages in comparison to men and
that these forces constitute a valid "factor other than sex."' 117 It is no
surprise that the Eleventh Circuit, as did the Second, Sixth, and Ninth

109. Id. at 875.
110. Id. at 878.
111. Id. at 877. The Kouba court admitted: "In drafting the Act, however, Congress did not

limit the exception to job-evaluation systems. Instead, it excepted 'any other factor other than sex'
and thus created a 'broad general exception."' Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., lst Sess.

pt. 7, at 3 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689).
112. Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876. The Kouba court justified its incorporation of a business-related

requirement by explaining that "[s]ince an employer could easily manipulate factors having a close
correlation to gender as a guise to pay female employees discriminatorily low salaries, it would contravene the Act to allow their use simply because they also are facially neutral or do not produce
complete segregation." Id.
113. Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876. See also Maxwell v. City of Tucson, 803 F.2d 444 (9h Cir.

1986) (applying the Kouba analysis in holding that an employer could justify a pay differential only
by setting forth a business-related "factor other than sex").
114. 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).

115. Id. at 1571.
116. Id. at 1570.
117. Id.
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Circuits, justified a business relation requirement for the "factor other
than sex" defense by deferring to the Act's legislative history s The
court found that "[t]he legislative history thus indicates that the 'factor
other than sex' exception applies when the disparity results from unique
characteristics of the same job; from an individual's experience, training,
or ability; or from special exigent circumstances connected with the business.""' 9 Based on the Act's legislative history, this court held that
General Motors did not satisfy its burden of justifying its market force
theory as a business-related "factor other than sex.""'2
The problem with the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits'
judicial decisions is that they rely too heavily on the Act's legislative
history in order to justify the business-related "factor other than sex!
defense.'
Additionally, these circuits have failed to acknowledge the
problems associated with relying on legislative history and have only
referred to certain congressional debates to justify their view.'" For
example, each circuit failed to mention that Representative Goodell, the
bill's primary sponsor, clearly explained that the "sole factor that we are
inserting here as a restriction [is sex]."'2 Furthermore, even though
the Ninth Circuit in Kouba admits that the fourth affirmative defense's
plain meaning creates a "broad general exception," it deliberately decides
to ignore the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation by explaining
that Congress must have intended a business relation requirement.
Otherwise, an employer could set forth any gender-neutral factor as a
mere pretext for discrimination. 2 4 This is not a credible argument
because if that was Congress' intent, Congress could have drafted or
amended the fourth affirmative defense to read: "any other factor other
than sex that is business related." However, Congress did not do so and,
as a result, the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits' interpretation
of the fourth affirmative defense's language violates the spirit of the
plain meaning rule."z Since 1917, the plain meaning rule has been
consistently upheld by the Supreme Court as the starting place for

118. Id. at 1571.
119. Id. See also H.L REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 7, at 3 (1963), reprintedin 1963
U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689.
120. Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1570.
121. See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571; Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
122. See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 157 1; Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876. See supra

text accompanying notes 56-62.
123. 109 CoNG. REc. 9198 (1963).
124. Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876, 877.
125. Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 524; J.C.Penney Co., 843 F.2d at 253; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1570, 1571;
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
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statutory interpretation when the statute's language is clear. 26
V.

CRITICISM OF THE FIFTH CIRcuiT's INTERPRETATION

Although the Fifth Circuit in Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane27 does

not interpret the "factor other than sex" to be business-related, the court
erroneously applies the "factor other than sex" exemption to both the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII by requiring an additional burden shift after
the production of evidence on the affirmative defense. 2 ' The Fifth
Circuit applies a disparate-treatment analysis to plaintiff's claim of wage
discrimination and requires the plaintiff to rebut the employer's justification for the wage differential by showing that the "factor other than
sex" was a pretext for the employer's discriminatory motive.'29 By
providing the plaintiff with an opportunity to rebut, a privilege not meant
to be read into the Equal Pay Act,' the court erroneously fails to treat
the "factor other than sex" as a complete affirmative defense.
In this case, the plaintiff, Ms. Plemer, began working for ParsonsGilbane as a Personnel Assistant.'

Months later, Parsons-Gilbane

promoted Plemer to the position of Equal Employment Opportunity
('EEO") Representative and increased her salary.' The EEO Representative reported to the EEO Officer. Approximately one year later,
Parsons-Gilbane decided to create a position for a full-time EEO Officer,
and Ms. Plemer applied for the position with several recommendations.134 However, Parsons-Gilbane hired a male, who had more
experience at this position than Plemer, and set his salary substantially
higher than Plemer's1 31 Consequently, Plemer filed a charge with the
EEOC alleging that Parsons-Gilbane had discriminately failed to promote
her to EEO Officer because of her sex and had discriminately paid her
126. SeeMCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Tel. &Tel. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2223, 2229-30
(1994); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
127. 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983).
128. Id. at 1135.
129. Id. at 1137.
130. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974). The Supreme Court
held that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to justify
the pay differential based on one of the Act's four affirmative defenses. Id. If the employer meets
his burden, the plaintiff does not have an opportunity to rebut. Id.
131. Plemer, 713 F.2d at 1130.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. Both a caucus of employees and an officer within the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs endorsed Plemer for the position. Id.
135. Id. at 1130, 1137.
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less money than the promoted male Officer.'36 The district court found
that Plemer's discriminatory claims were without merit 37 and that her
statistical evidence regarding disparities between men's and women's
salaries in defendant's white collar departments were not indicative of
discrimination because the data did not include variables (such as
experience, education, and seniority) which might justify the wage
differential."' Plemer then filed an appeal to the Fifth Circuit.3
The Fifth Circuit held that "Plemer's evidence, apart from the
statistics, did make aprimafaciecase under both the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII, by demonstrating that she was paid less that her male successor.., for the identical position."'
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit
found the statistics to be relevant, and thus should have been used by the
district court in deciding whether Parsons-Gilbane's justification for this
wage differential was valid or pretextual."4
In reviewing Plemer's Equal Pay Act claim, the Fifth Circuit
referred to two Supreme Court decisions, Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine42 and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 4 3 for the notion that a plaintiff must be offered a "full and fair
opportunity" to show that an employer's justification for a wage
differential is merely a pretext for discrimination.'
The Fifth Circuit
found that if an employee demonstrates by statistics that an employer has
implemented a discriminatory policy of hiring toward employees of a
particular sex, a court may assume that an employer's justification for a
wage differential is pretextual and that the differential is the result of the
employer's discriminatory practice. 4 5 Thus, by failing to consider
Plemer's statistics, the circuit court found that the district court denied
Plemer her "full and fair opportunity" to show that Parsons-Gilbane's
reasons for the wage differential were pretextual 46 The Fifth Circuit
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1134.
139. Id. at 1131.
140. Id. at 1136.
141. Id. at 1137.
142. 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981) (holding that when a court performs Title VII disparate treatment
analysis, a plaintiff must be given an opportunity to show that the employer's justification for the
pay differential is a pretext for discrimination).
143. 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973) (similar to Burdine, holding that when a court performs Title
VII disparate treatment analysis, a plaintiff must be given an opportunity to show that the employer's
justification for the pay differential is a pretext for discrimination).
144. Plemer,713 F.2d at 1137.

145. Id.
146. Id.
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found that the district court's denial of this "full and fair opportunity"
was reversible error.' 47
4 and McDonnell
The Fifth Circuit erred by relying on Burdine"
4
9
Douglas' because both decisions dealt with Title VII, which unlike
the Equal Pay Act, requires disparate-treatment analysis in certain situations.5 0 Even though the Fifth Circuit acknowledges that the Supreme
Court in these decisions articulated "standards regarding pretext and the
use of statistics to prove pretext in Title VII cases," the Fifth Circuit
erroneously held that these standards also apply to claims brought under
the Equal Pay Act. 5' The court reasoned that if this were not the case,
a plaintiff in an Equal Pay Act claim would not have a "full and fair
opportunity" to rebut evidence that an employer's wage differential was
based on a valid "factor other than sex."'5 2 Essentially, the Fifth
Circuit, by applying the two Supreme Court decisions in an improper
manner, created its own standards for analyzing an Equal Pay Act claim
in order to provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to show that the
employer's justification is a mere pretext for discrimination.5 3 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to determine whether the plaintiff's statistical evidence
4
proved that the employer's justification was a pretext."1
Instead, the Fifth Circuit should have instructed the district court to
determine whether the employer's asserted justification constituted a
valid "factor other than sex." Here, Parsons-Gilbane asserted that the
male EEO Officer had more experience than Plemer and that his
experience constituted a valid "factor other than sex" that justified his
higher salary. 55 Although the Equal Pay Act does not provide the
plaintiff with an opportunity to rebut an employer's "factor other than
sex," the court will necessarily determine whether the employer's
147. Id.
148. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
149. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
150. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Under Title
VII, a plaintiffcan support a claim of sex discrimination by demonstrating either disparate treatment
or disparate impact. Id. at 335 n.15. Disparate treatment requires proof of discriminatory intent,
while disparate impact does not. Id. The Court explained that disparate treatment occurs when the
employer treats some employees less favorably than other employees because of their sex, race,
color, religion, or national origin. Id. In comparison, disparate impact occurs when the employer
engages in facially neutral practices that affect one group more severely than another. Id.
151. Plemer,713 F.2d at 1137 n.8.
152. Id.
153. Id.

154. Id. at 1137.
155. Id.
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justification is a mere pretext for discrimination when it examines the validity of the "factor other than sex."15 6 Once the plaintiff presents a
prima facie case, the burden will shift to the employer to show the
validity of this "factor other than sex" as an affirmative defense." 7
The burden does not shift back to the employee for the purposes of
rebuttal. 5 ' In this case, Parsons-Gilbane met its burden by justifying
the wage differential based on the male's greater experience.1 59 However, it would not be a valid "factor other than sex" if the evidence
showed that in previous years Parsons-Gilbane had hired males over
more experienced female employees.'6 Such a practice would then
indicate that Parsons-Gilbane is using the male's greater experience as a
pretext for discrimination, but this was not the case. Furthermore,
because the data failed to take into account "factors other than sex" such
as experience, seniority, and merit, the district court did not err when it
disregarded statistics that showed men received higher salaries than
women. 1 ' If these statistics did take such factors into account, then
the district court's failure to consider these statistics would be erroneous.
Although the Fifth Circuit does not impose a business-related "factor
other than sex" requirement, it fails to interpret the Equal Pay Act
properly because it misreads two Supreme Court decisions as supporting
the use of a Title VII disparate-treatment analysis when deciding claims
brought under the Equal Pay Act.'62
VI.

PROPER JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 'ACTOR
THAN SEX" DEFENSE

OTER

The Seventh 63 and Eighth Circuits' are the only two circuits
that interpret the Act's fourth affirmative defense properly. Neither
circuit requires an employer to justify a wage differential by setting forth
a business-related "factor other than sex." 165 Both circuits- apply the
Act's "factor other than sex" according to its plain meaning and correctly

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974).
Id.
Id.
Plemer,713 F.2d at 1137.
Id.
Id. at 1134.
Id. at 1137.

163. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989); Covington v. Southern Ill. Univ.,

816 F.2d 317,322 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
164. Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 100-03 (8th Cir. 1980).
165. Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211; Covington, 816 F.2d at 322; Strecker, 640 F.2d at 100.
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conclude that the defense's restrictions are limited only to a showing of
gender-neutrality.' 66 Furthermore, although both circuits have examined the Act's legislative history and have properly found that Congress
intended a broad interpretation of the "factor other than sex" defense in
order to preserve employer discretion, neither circuit relies on the Act's
legislative history to justify a gender-neutral "factor other than sex."' 6
In Covington v. Southern Illinois University,"s the plaintiff, a
female assistant professor, sued Southern Illinois University ("SIY)
under the Equal Pay Act, alleging that by paying her less than her male
predecessor for performing the same work SIU had discriminated against
her on the basis of sex. 69 The plaintiff argued that the defendant had
set forth no reason other than the male employee's prior salary to justify
the wage differential and that this did not constitute a valid "factor other
than sex" since his prior salary was not business-related. 7
The
Seventh Circuit found that even though the male employee's prior salary
was not a business-related "factor other than sex," the defendant set forth
a valid justification.1'' In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit
cited to two other Seventh Circuit cases.'2 In Patkusv. Sangamon-Cass
Consortium, the Seventh Circuit upheld, as a valid "factor other than
sex," the non business-related reorganization plan of the employer which
had led to a male employee being paid more than his female predecessor
who had been fired prior to the employer's reorganization. 7 4 InEnde
v. Board of Regents of Regency Universities,"5 male professors brought
an Equal Pay Act challenge to a university plan which adjusted female
1 76
faculty members' salaries in order to remedy past discrimination.
Although the university plan was not business-related and created
isolated instances of salary disparities between female and male faculty

166. Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211; Covington, 816 F.2d at 322; Strecker, 640 F.2d at 100.
167. Fallon,882 F.2d at 1211; Covington, 816 F.2d at 322; Strecker, 640 F.2d at 100.

168. 816 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
169. Id. at 318.

170. Id. at 321.
171. Id. at 322.
172. Id. at 322 (citing Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1261-62 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding gender-neutral "factor other than sex" set forth by employer is sufficient to justify
a pay differential); Ende v. Board of Regents of Regency Univs., 757 F.2d 176, 182-83 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding "that an increase which restores a victim of past discrimination to the salary level
he/she would have enjoyed in the absence of the discrimination qualifies as a defense (iv) even
where the discrimination itself was based on sex:)).
173. 769 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1985).
174. Id. 1261, 1262.

175. 757 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1985).
176. Id. at 177.
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male faculty7 members, the court held the plan to be a valid "factor other
17
than sex.'
Thus, the Seventh Circuit has firmly held that an employer can
justify a pay differential by showing that the "factor other than sex" is
gender-neutral and that this neutrality can be evidenced by demonstrating
a lack of discriminatory application and effect.1 78 After Covington, the
Seventh Circuit in Fallon v. Illinois79 affirmed its broad reading of the
In Fallon, the plaintiff
Act's 'Tactor other than sex" defense."'
brought an Equal Pay Act claim against the State of Illinois because a
state law only permitted wartime veterans to be eligible for Veterans
Consequently, this law confined most
Service Officer positions.'
women to a lower paying job requiring the same work.'8 The Seventh
Circuit upheld the law by finding that a wartime veteran's status could
constitute a "factor other than sex" even though it is not businessrelated. 3' Moreover, the court found that an employer can justify a
pay differential at the work place by merely showing that the "factor
Gender-neutrality is
other than sex" set forth is gender-neutral.
determined by examining whether the factor is discriminatory applied or
if it causes a discriminatory effect.'"
The Seventh Circuit in Fallon, referring to the Supreme Court
decision in Coming Glass Works v. Brennan,5 found that the "factor
other than sex" defense is a broad "catch-all" exception that contains a
limitless number of factors, so long as they do not involve sex. 6
Additionally, the Fallon court cited to the Supreme Court decision in
County of Washington v. Gunther"s7 to support its view that a businessrelated "factor other than sex" would be counterproductive to employer
discretion.'
After analyzing the Act's legislative history, the Court
in Gunther found that Congress intended a broad reading of the "factor
other than sex" in order to prevent courts and administrative agencies

177. Id. at 182-83.
178. Covington, 816 F.2d at 322.

179. 882 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1989).
180. Id. at 1211.
181. Id. at 1207.

182. Id.
183. Id. at 1212. "The statute required only that [Veteran Service Officers] be wartime
veterans.... This could include women as well as men." Id.
184. Id. at 1211.
185. 417 U.S. 188, 197 (1974).
186. Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211.

187. 452 U.S. 161, 171 (1981).
188. Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211.
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from substituting their judgment for the employer's judgment. This
broad reading avoids unnecessary disruption of bona fide job evaluation
systems." 9 Thus, the Seventh Circuit in Fallon clearly found that the
Act's "factor other than sex" affirmative defense does not impose upon
the employer the undue burden of proving that the factor is businessrelated. 9
Similarly, in Boriss v. Addison FarmersInsurance Co.,t t a district
9
court in the Seventh Circuit followed the standards set in Covington, 2
and Fallon.93 In Boriss, the defendant insurance company justified a
pay disparity between the female plaintiff and three male underwriters
based upon the males' greater experience and higher educational
achievements, claiming that these factors represented valid "factor[s]
other than sex."'19 The district court granted the defendant summary
judgment, explaining that it need not determine whether a college degree
was a prerequisite for the position because a college degree clearly
satisfies the gender-neutral criterion for the "any other factor other than
sex" affirmative defense. 9 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit, in Strecker
v. Grand Forks County Social Service Board,'96 refused to interpret the
"factor other than sex" defense as one that must be business-related.' 97
In Strecker, a former female employee of the county social services
board brought an Equal Pay Act claim alleging that she performed equal
work in comparison to her male predecessor but received less pay
because of her sex.'98 The Eighth Circuit held that the board's classification system, which took into account the plaintiff's lower educational and experience levels in setting her salary, was a valid "factor
other than sex."'9 9 Additionally, the court found that it did not need
to consider whether the classification system was business-related since
the board had properly set forth a gender-neutral criterion as a jus189. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981).
190. Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211.
191. No. 91-C-3144, 1993 WL 284331 (N.D. Ii. July 26, 1993).
192. Covington v. Southern IlI. Univ., 816 F.2d 317 (7th Cir.), cart. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987).
193. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206 (7h Cir. 1989).
194. Boriss, 1993 WL 284331, at *9.
195. Id. at *9, *10. See also Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir.
1994) (granting summary judgment to defendant because pay disparity was based on the male
employee's prior salary and the male employee's more advanced education, both gender-neutral factors).
196. 640 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1980).
197. Id. at 100.
198. 1d at 99.
199. Id. at 103.
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tification for the plaintiff's lower pay.2 "
VII.

CONCLUSION

By applying the plain meaning of the affirmative defense when
analyzing whether a pay differential is based on a "factor other than sex,"
the court properly ends its inquiry when the employer produces sufficient
evidence that a gender-neutral criterion is the reason for the pay
differential.2 1 When the language is clear, as it is in this case, the
starting place for statutory interpretation is the plain meaning of the
statute.2 " Since 1917, the Supreme Court has affirmed and reaffirmed
the plain meaning rule.20 3 This rule has been closely followed for over
seventy-five years because judges are not in the position to legislate law.
The role of judges is to interpret statutes and to rule on whether laws are
constitutional, not to implement their own views in spite of what
Congress has clearly delineated in the statute. Federal judges are not
accountable to the public because they are appointed to life terms. Thus,
a judge does not answer to the people in the same fashion as a
Congressman or Senator. In the democratic system, since the people
vote for the legislator who will best represent their interests, it would be
a grave injustice to have judges implement their ideas of law when the
people have already elected their representatives to enact the laws that
best suit them. Even though the Constitution's separation of powers doctrine protects against such overreaching by the judiciary, the Second,
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have engaged in judicial legislation
by rewriting the Act's "any other factor other than sex" defense to
require a business relationship?'
This judicial legislation undercuts
the very purpose of our democratic system.
These circuits have implemented a business-related "factor other
than sex" requirement when it is obvious that the language of the statute
does not call for one. 5 Their rationale is twofold. First, they believe

200. Id. at 100.
201. See Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211; Covington, 816 F.2d at 322; Strecker, 640 F.2d at 100.
202. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917).
203. Id. See also MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2223,
2229-30 (1974).
204. See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 440 (1992); EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988); Glenn v.
General Motors, 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988); Kouba
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
205. See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d at 253; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571;
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
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that the legislative history strongly indicates Congress' intent for a
business-related "factor other than sex" requirement.206 However, these
circuits fail to mention that they only defer to certain parts of the Act's
legislative history and that they deliberately chose to ignore the other
parts which strongly suggest that the "factor other than sex" defense was
intended to be applied on a gender-neutral basis.20 7 In addition, there
is absolutely no proof that a statute's legislative history is a reliable
indicator of Congress' true intent.2 " Furthermore, if Congress truly
intended the "factor other than sex" to be business-related, why did it not
draft or amend the Act to read "any other factor other than sex that is
business-related?" It is hard to believe that Congress intended for a
business-related "factor other than sex" but just forgot to insert the words
"business-related," or that Congress wanted to place the undue burden on
the courts to decipher the Act's legislative history and find a businessrelated requirement. The only plausible explanation as to why Congress
did not draft a business-related "factor other than sex" is that it simply
did not intend to do so.
The second rationale set forth by these circuits is that if a businessrelated requirement is not incorporated into the Act, then employers
could easily make up any gender-neutral factor that is really a pretext for
discrimination.2" 9 This argument lacks credibility because when the
burden shifts to the employer to show a gender-neutral "factor other than
sex" in response to plaintiff's prima facie case, the court in determining
the validity of the "factor other than sex" will be in a position to determine whether the employer's justification is a mere pretext for discrimination.210
A hypothetical will clearly illustrate my point. Suppose an
employer has made it a policy not to hire individuals with red hair for
management level positions. The employer then refuses to promote a
red-haired female for the position and instead hires a dark-haired male.
The woman then brings a claim under the Equal Pay Act alleging that
she is performing the same work as a manager but is not receiving equal
pay due to her female status. Furthermore, she alleges that the
employer's justification that her hair is red is not a valid "factor other
than sex," but rather a pretext for discrimination. In determining whether

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571.
See 109 CONM. REc. 9198 (1963).
See supra text accompanying notes 56-62.
See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974).
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the plaintiff's red hair is a valid gender-neutral criterion or a mere pretext
for discrimination, a court will have to examine whether red hair is more
prevalent in females in comparison to males. If this is the case, the
employer would be in violation of the Act because a valid gender-neutral
criterion has not been set forth. However, if evidence shows red hair is
just as common for women as it is for men, then the employer can use
this as a justification for a wage differential since it is clearly based on
a gender-neutral criterion.
It is paramount that employers have the maximum amount of
discretion when setting forth employment conditions.?" Nonetheless,
if the evidence supports that red hair is equally prevalent in men and
women, the employer would be in violation of the Act if he were to later
hire a red-haired male for the management position because the employer
would then be using the red-hair as a pretext for sex discrimination. This
type of evidence would come to light when the court is determining the
validity of the employer's "factor other than sex" defense.2 2
Additionally, society benefits by not imposing a business-related
"factor other than sex." First, courts will not have to waste time and
money exploring whether the gender-neutral criterion is related to the
requirements of the particular job in question.2 13 The court system is
already overwhelmed with cases and there is no need to overburden it
even more.
Second, employers will be more prone to lawsuits by disgruntled
employees since it will be much easier for employees to bring claims and
harder for employers to defend them. A business-related "factor other
than sex" requirement would translate into a more expensive society
because an employer will factor in the cost of defending how the "factor
other than sex" is related to a legitimate business requirement. This will
affect consumers because it will inevitably lead employers to raise prices
on goods and services in order to protect themselves against future
lawsuits.
Third, a business-related requirement would seriously undercut the
value society places on employer discretion. Individuals will now be
more hesitant to start a new business because they will not have the
freedom of running it in the fashion they envisioned. Thus, a courtimposed business-related requirement would undermine an individual's

211.
212.
213.
July 26,

See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171 (1981).
See Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196-97.
See Boriss v. Addison Farmers Ins. Co., No. 91-C-3144,1993 WVL 284331, at *9 (N.D. 111.
1993).
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fundamental right of freedom of enterprise which is the very root of our
capitalistic society. This will hurt society because less goods and
services and fewer jobs will be available to the public. If anything can
be determined from the Act's legislative history, it is that Congress never
14
intended for the Equal Pay Act to undercut employer discretion.
This has been indicated in numerous Supreme Court decisions.21
Thus, for the numerous reasons and policy goals stated above, the Supreme Court must adopt the Seventh and Eight Circuits' reasoning and
hold that a business-related requirement must not be incorporated when
applying the Act's "factor other than sex" defense.
Jeffrey K. Brown

214. See Gunther,452 U.S. at 170-71. The Supreme Court found: "Under the Equal Pay Act,
the courts and administrative agencies are not permitted to 'substitute their judgment for the
judgment of the employer... who [has] established and applied a bona fide job rating system,' so
long as it does not discriminate on the basis of sex:' Id. (citing 109 CONG. REC. 9209 (1963)
(statement of Representative Goodell).
215. See, e.g., Gunther,452 U.S. at 170-71; Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 199-201.
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